

To:

Public financial institutions: Export Import Bank of the United States (US EXIM); Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC); UK Export Finance (UKEF); Export-Import Bank of Thailand (Thai Exim); Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero (SACE); Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI); Export Credit Insurance Corporation of South Africa (ECIC); Atradius Dutch State Business (ADSB); Cassa Depositi e Prestiti; African Development Bank (AfDB); African Export Import Bank; Development Bank of Southern Africa; Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa; Korea Development Bank; Export Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM); US International Development Finance Corp (DFC).

Private financial institutions: Société Générale; Crédit Agricole; Mizuho Bank; JP Morgan; Standard Chartered Bank; MUFG Bank; Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation; Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank; SBI Shinsei Bank; Nippon Life Insurance; ABSA Bank; Nedbank; Rand Merchant Bank; Standard Bank; ICBC.

December 19th, 2024

Subject: Urgent call to withdraw financial support for TotalEnergies' Mozambique LNG project and endorse the call for an independent international investigation into reported human rights violations associated with its Afungi premises

This letter is a follow-up to our [letter](#) of a year ago (16 November 2023) in which we outlined why your financial involvement in the TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG project should be reconsidered. Many of the issues and impacts we raised remain unresolved or have worsened.

One year later, **regional security and democratic processes in Mozambique have deteriorated, the project was reportedly associated with severe human rights violations, and the Afungi communities whose lives have been disrupted were forced to demonstrate at the gates of the TotalEnergies Afungi site against resettlement violations.** This letter details critical new information and sets out what we expect from [Financial Institution].

Electoral fraud, political assassinations and civil unrest

Mozambique is currently experiencing instability and repression in the midst of its “worst-ever post-election violence”.¹ This situation was ignited in mid October by allegations of electoral fraud and the brutal assassinations of two senior opposition figures.² Thousands of people took to the street to demand electoral justice, but peaceful civilian demonstrators faced violent repression from the police and military.³ Internet

¹ Institute for Security Studies. 14 November 2024. [Mozambique's last stand for democracy?](#).

² The Daily Maverick. 24 October 2024. [Assassinations, fraud and intimidation mark Mozambique's 2024 elections](#); Institute for Security Studies. 22 October 2024. [Latest elections widen Mozambique's democratic deficit](#); and Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP). 19 October 2024. [Nota de repúdio do Centro de Integridade Pública \(CIP\) ao bárbaro assassinato do advogado Elvino Dias na cidade de Maputo](#).

³ African Arguments. 07 November 2024. [Mozambique: A revolution born in the search for electoral justice](#); and Human Rights Watch. 19 October 2024. [Mozambique: Post-Election Protests Violently Repressed](#).

restrictions were imposed, violating human rights such as access to information and freedom of speech.⁴

Demonstrations escalated, as did the levels of violence inflicted on civilians. By December 15th 2024, 128 casualties and thousands of injuries were reported, with at least 274 people shot, and about 3,450 people detained in relation to the electoral violence.⁵ The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) “urged authorities in Mozambique to prevent and immediately stop the violence and repression of journalists, lawyers, human rights defenders and protesters and ensure those responsible are investigated and prosecuted”.⁶

State violence has been evident in the country for years, with death squads murdering civil society leaders, academics, journalists, activists and violently repressing young people who protest.⁷ There are also reports of the illegal detention, torture or “disappearance” of journalists who were reporting on the insurgency in the conflict-torn Cabo Delgado province, where the Mozambique LNG project is situated.⁸

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) warned: “The manipulation of elections by electoral management bodies in favour of the ruling party is crippling democracy, eroding the credibility of institutions and generating post-election violence”.⁹ On December 13th 2024, the Mozambique Bar Association raised concerns about the processes being followed to validate the election results, and called for a “recount of the votes or their annulment”.¹⁰

The electoral demonstrations are a rallying point for youth country-wide to voice their disillusionment with their government, but it must be recognised that the drivers are the same as for the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Disenfranchisement levels are especially high in the resource-rich north, in a context of long-term socio-economic neglect, and with entire communities required to leave their homes and livelihoods for mega projects such as Mozambique LNG.¹¹ Significantly, operations of a number of other mega projects across the country have been affected by the protests, including Sasol’s Pande and Temane gas project, Kenmare Resources heavy sands mining, MOZAL aluminium smelter, Safira Mozambique Ceramics¹², and two gas-fired electricity generators near the Ressano Garcia border post, with disenfranchised protestors putting up road barricades

⁴ Human Rights Watch. 06 November 2024. [Mozambique: Post-Election Internet Restrictions Hinder Rights](#).

⁵ Centro para Democracia e Direitos Humanos (CDD). 15 December 2024. [Political Crisis and Post-Electoral Violence in Mozambique: The Silence of Dialogue and the Escalation of Repression](#); and

Club of Mozambique. 06 December 2024. [Mozambique Elections: Two state buildings destroyed, eight detained Friday – police](#).

⁶ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 15 November 2024. [Mozambique: Post-election violence and repression must stop, say UN experts](#).

⁷ The Daily Maverick. 30 October 2024. [South Africa must assert leadership in Mozambique crisis](#); and Amnesty International. 2023. [Mozambique 2023](#).

⁸ The Daily Maverick. 24 October 2024. [Assassinations, fraud and intimidation mark Mozambique's 2024 elections](#); and The Daily Maverick. 30 October 2024. [South Africa must assert leadership in Mozambique crisis](#).

⁹ Institute for Security Studies. 22 October 2024. [Latest elections widen Mozambique's democratic deficit](#).

¹⁰ Ordem dos Advogados de Moçambique. 13 December 2024. [Reflexão da Ordem dos Advogados de Moçambique sobre o Processo em Curso de Validação e Proclamação dos Resultados das Eleições de 9 de Outubro de 2024](#).

¹¹ Observatório do Meio Rural. September 2024. [Factores de conflitualidade em Moçambique](#).

¹² Safira Mozambique Ceramics factory suspended activities temporarily on 09 December 2024 following a violent strike. 360Mozambique, 10 December 2024. [Safira ceramics factory inaugurated in september closes after violent strike](#)

and occupying a shipyard, among other actions.¹³ The Syrah Resources' Balama graphite mine in Cabo Delgado province declared *force majeure* on 12 December 2024, after sustained demonstrations by farmers since November.¹⁴

The process to restart the Mozambique LNG project is taking place in this unstable context of extreme nation-wide disillusionment, disenfranchisement, protest and civic repression, developed over years of state repression and corruption.

Reports of human rights violations by public security forces linked to the project

In late September, [Politico](#) published an article in which it reported on an alleged massacre of civilians, which was allegedly committed near TotalEnergies' Afungi premises in mid 2021 by public security forces.¹⁵ These allegations add substantially to the list of accusations of human rights violations linked to the project, research showing inadequate due diligence processes,¹⁶ and court cases and investigations.¹⁷ The 2023 French criminal complaint is now under preliminary investigation by the French Public Prosecutor.¹⁸

In its article, Politico reported on alleged violations against civilians committed in July-September 2021, three months after the major insurgent attack on Palma town that spurred increased militarisation of the region and resulted in TotalEnergies declaring *force majeure* on the project. According to Politico, Mozambican troops assaulted civilians who were seeking safety, and imprisoned the men in windowless, metal shipping containers near the entrance of the Mozambique LNG site.

It reports that men – 180 to 250 individuals – were detained for three months, denied water, starved, beaten, suffocated, tortured, stabbed and, finally, most of them “disappeared”. Women were reportedly subjected to repeated sexual assault and humiliation before being released. Only 26 of the prisoners are estimated by the investigation team to have survived. According to the article, the troops involved “ran their detention-and-execution operation from the TotalEnergies' gatehouse” with the unit leader reported to say that his mission was to protect the “project of Total”.

Between August 2020 and October 2023, TotalEnergies was known to be directly providing food, equipment, accommodation and individual bonuses to the Joint Task Force (JTF) of the Mozambican army, under an agreement that the JTF would “ensure the security of Mozambique LNG project activities in the Afungi site and across the

¹³ Agência de Informação de Moçambique. 08 December 2024. [Protestos afectam indústria extractiva e colocam em risco crescimento económico](#); and Club of Mozambique. 13 December 2024. [CIP Mozambique Elections: Protests close mines but gain concessions](#).

¹⁴ Club of Mozambique. 12 December 2024. [Syrah declares force majeure for its graphite mine in Mozambique](#); and 360 Mozambique. 11 November 2024. [Syrah Resources 'worried' about land conflict at Balama Mine](#).

¹⁵ Politico, 26 September 2024. ["All must be beheaded": Allegations of atrocities at French energy giant's African stronghold](#).

¹⁶ Uprights, July 2023. [Assessment of TotalEnergies' Mozambique LNG Project Human Rights due diligence](#).

¹⁷ Le Monde, 04 May 2024. [France Probes TotalEnergies over 2021 Mozambique Attack](#); and Les Amis de la Terre France, 10 October 2023. [Total faces criminal charges in french courts for its negligence during Palma attack](#).

¹⁸ *ibid.*

broader area of operations of the project".¹⁹ A 2023 assessment commissioned by TotalEnergies concluded that this direct link between Mozambique LNG and the Mozambican army "would have the effect [...] of making the project a party to the conflict".²⁰

In November 2024, Le Monde and SourceMaterial reported that TotalEnergies was aware that JTF troops were "accused of raping, abducting and killing civilians".²¹ The articles report details from TotalEnergies' internal reports (13 files, 423 pages) dated between mid-2020 and late 2022, which had been shared with the Italian national development bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, and possibly other financial institutions.

According to the article, documents from 2021 reveal that "the community leadership's biggest concerns were intimidation, extortion, and violence," and that "residents 'regularly reported' human rights violations including torture, detentions and disappearances at the hands of the task force." The violations also reportedly affected residents of Quitunda resettlement village within the Afungi gas site. It is worth noting that already in 2021, Amnesty International had accused public and private security forces of war crimes relating to other incidents of violence.²²

In response to Politico, Mozambique's Ministry of National Defence "categorically regrets and refutes the allegations" and expressed "total openness and willingness to accept a transparent and impartial investigation."²³ The EU parliament has requested Mozambican authorities to provide "elements of clarification in order to shed light on the events described in the article."²⁴

Mozambique LNG has published a response to the allegations in the Politico article, in which it claims it has not identified any corroborating information, despite maintaining channels of communication with the local communities during that period.²⁵ The analysis confirms JTF presence at the time: "The facilities on the land dedicated to the projects were protected by a security force composed of soldiers and police officers (Joint Task Force or JTF) whose function was to protect the Afungi peninsula". The company urged Mozambican authorities to take up the investigation.

This analysis raises critical questions:

- If the Mozambique LNG project, of which TotalEnergies is the operator and largest shareholder, was genuinely unaware of violations reportedly perpetrated by the security forces it was paying, what does this suggest about its competence and its ability to effectively prevent such serious human rights violations?
- Is TotalEnergies' statement that it has not been informed about the alleged massacre intended at avoiding accountability?

¹⁹ Rufin and Glowacki, 2023. ['Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocimboa area'](#). Commissioned by TotalEnergies: and TotalEnergies, 24 August 2020. [Total signs agreement with government of Mozambique regarding security of Mozambique LNG project](#); and Zitamar News, 20 May 2024. [Inside the new security deal between Mozambique and gas project investors](#).

²⁰ Rufin and Glowacki, 2023. [Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian, and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocimboa area.pdf](#), page 20. Commissioned by TotalEnergies.

²¹ Le Monde Afrique. 24 November 2024. [TotalEnergies savait que des exactions étaient commises sur son site gazier au mozambique](#); and SourceMaterial. 24 November 2024. ["Don't look back or we'll shoot"](#).

²² Amnesty International. 2021. [What I saw is death: war crimes in Mozambique's forgotten Cape](#).

²³ Agência de Informação de Moçambique. 14 October 2024. [Defense ministry denies atrocities against civilians in Cabo Delgado](#); and Republica de Moçambique, Ministério da Defesa Nacional. 11 October 2024. "Ministério da Defesa Nacional refuta alegações sobre atrocidades no Teatro Operacional Norte".

²⁴ European Parliament. 30 October 2024. [Answer to Parliamentary question - P-001864/2024\(ASW\)](#).

²⁵ Mozambique LNG. 26 November 2024. [Mozambique LNG: results of the analysis undertaken in response to the allegations made in the article published 26 September 2024 by Politico](#).

If the Mozambican government or TotalEnergies lead the investigation into the incidents this would definitively call into question the objectivity and credibility of the results.

Urgent appeal for immediate independent investigation:

We are urgently appealing for an **immediate independent international investigation** into the series of atrocities [reportedly](#) committed near the **TotalEnergies Mozambique LNG** Afungi premises by public security forces reportedly acting in the service of the company. We ask that this independent investigation is conducted by an **international or regional intergovernmental human rights mechanism** – such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights – with the intention of ensuring **justice and truth for the victims and the safety of survivors, families and witnesses**. Working with an internationally or regionally officially recognised human rights body with the required expertise and mandate, is key for the protection of the victims and witnesses.

Resettlement violations in the Afungi gas-affected communities

In a momentous show of courage, the Afungi communities exercised their constitutional right to express their discontent with the gas company's behaviour regarding the occupation of their lands and compensation payments and agreements. For two weeks in November 2024, villagers, driven by their frustration and desperation, gathered at the Mozambique LNG project from early light, taking direct action in obstructing the entrances. TotalEnergies eventually entered into negotiations with two of the communities, but there is no indication of whether it intends to reach resolution with all affected communities.²⁶

Mozambique LNG project is required to adequately compensate families who are affected by resettlement or livelihoods and economic losses as a result of its activities. The resettlement process proved to be complex. Mozambicans have habits and customs that make them inseparable from the land where they were born, and assigning a monetary value to that land is culturally inappropriate and unfair for families. TotalEnergies declared in May 2024 that all compensations had been paid.²⁷ In June 2024, Mozambican NGO Justiça Ambiental! received over 100 complaints from families seeking assistance around compensation and resettlement matters; and over the past three years, gas-affected families submitted about 1,300 complaints about compensation and 800 complaints about the allocation of fields, many of which remain unresolved. This includes families in the villages of Quitunda, Senga, Mangala, Macala, Maganja, Monjane, and five

²⁶ Say no to gas in Mozambique! Campaign. 15 November 2024. [The land belongs to Mozambicans. not France.](#)

²⁷ TotalEnergies SE. 24 May 2024. '[Assemblée générale ordinaire et extraordinaire du 24 mai 2024: Réponses aux questions écrites](#)'. During its 2024 AGM, TotalEnergies stated: "100% of people which have been resettled in Quitunda have been compensated including for their land following IFC standards. They have also received new plot of land so that they can practice agriculture; 'With the resumption of resettlement activities in June 2022 despite force majeure, the project; has completed the allocation of agricultural land plots to all households resettled in Quitunda.'; "100% of the families impacted by the DUAT are already compensated."

neighbourhoods of Palma who are seeking resolution regarding the lack of housing, machambas (farmlands) and partial or complete lack of compensation payments.

Families and communities are dynamic (e.g. children become adults and need their own lands for their own families, and many families are polygamous) and the resettlement must be reassessed in light of this as well as the changes in local populations resulting from the conflict. In addition, communication with affected individuals revealed that some sectors of communities were excluded from compensation processes, for example, women who harvest coastal resources, or fishermen who do not have their own boats. Eleven testimonies from affected people, recorded in June 2024, can be viewed [here](#).²⁸

For the communities affected, food security is an urgent concern. With machambas taken for the project and fishing access cut off or limited, families are producing and harvesting less food for home consumption and are also no longer earning income from sales. Regional insecurity limits safe access to fields and the coastline. Important cultural practices have not been accommodated, for example the simple matter of protecting mango trees which provide important nutrition in fresh and preserved form throughout the year. The cost of commercial foods is high, and the compensation payments or low-paying jobs cannot make up for a lifetime of livelihood resources. The people affected directly by the project are effectively being forced into poverty.

In conversations with Justiça Ambiental! community members shared that they believe that because the resettlement process has already taken so long, with so many interruptions and unanswered complaints, the process will only come to an end because the communities will be overcome with the fatigue of contesting the irregularities they are being forced to live with.

Continued presence of insurgency in Cabo Delgado

Security in Cabo Delgado remains precarious, with incidents of insurgent activity reported throughout the year.²⁹ As the election protests escalated in mid October 2024, the Mozambican government moved troops from Cabo Delgado to Maputo city, spurring an increase in insurgent attacks, with escalation over November.³⁰ One attack close to a Rwandan outpost resulted in the deaths of 12 members of the Namapara militia, a group of Cabo Delgado civilians who are thought to be enlisting local people to fight the insurgency.³¹ Insurgents were dispersed in small groups across the province in late November to early December, and seemed to be concentrated on gathering supplies, with one death reported.³²

In October 2024, over 700,000 war displaced people were still unable to return to their homes, and new waves of violence resulted in new waves of displaced people, although

²⁸ Say no to gas in Mozambique! Campaign. October 2024. '[A word from the people affected by Mozambique LNG Project](#)'.

²⁹ For frequent updates about political violence in Mozambique see: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) [Cabo Ligado](#) conflict observatory, Zitamar News, and MediaFax; and [Displacement tracking matrix](#) on Mozambique by the UN International Organization for Migration.

³⁰ Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP). 11 November 2024. [Insurgents step up attacks in Cabo Delgado during the post-election violence in Maputo](#).

³¹ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). 28 November 2024. [Cabo Ligado Update 11-24 November 2024](#); and Zitamar, February 2023. [Who are the Naparama](#).

³² Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). 12 December 2024. [Cabo Ligado Update 25 November to 8 December 2024](#).

some villages are returning to a degree of normality.³³ Over 600,000 war-displaced people have returned to their villages, but face significant hardships.³⁴ Education and health services are weakening and humanitarian aid is underfunded.³⁵ Uprooted people are deprived of homes, fields, wild foods and medicines, and support networks.³⁶ Many have witnessed or been subjected to brutal violence by the insurgents, and many are experiencing or are vulnerable to gender-based violence and sexual exploitation.³⁷ There is also distrust in military forces, as explained by the detail that over 13% of the Mozambican army's engagement in political violence since the start of the conflict was directed against civilians.³⁸

The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) explains that “the fertilizer” of armed violence in the province, is the poverty, unemployment, despair and social, economic and political exclusion in Cabo Delgado communities.³⁹ Indications are that recruitment into the insurgency is from a wide geographical base, including East African and Arab countries, but that the insurgents are mainly from northeast Cabo Delgado.⁴⁰ According to Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), extractive projects have not improved living conditions for the people affected. “This situation fuels the belief that the province is rich in natural resources, but that these do not benefit the people”.⁴¹

Cabo Delgado has seen an increase in militarisation, particularly since 2021, and particularly around the gas project sites, with troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Rwanda, and other countries bolstering the Mozambique army (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique, FADM). The SADC Mission in Mozambique officially withdrew in mid July 2024, Rwandan forces increased since about May 2024, with a presence of 4,000 reported in September 2024, and a small Tanzanian force is also maintained.⁴²

Tanzanian forces are focused on preventing insurgents crossing into Tanzania, while Rwandan forces are concentrated in the Afungi Peninsula and the towns of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, to protect the Mozambique LNG project.⁴³ The Namapara militia is also present in some districts.⁴⁴ Insurgents are reported to be adapting to the presence of

³³ UNHCR, December 2024. [UNHCR Mozambique operational update September October 2024](#).

In 2021 and 2022, over one million people were displaced in northern Mozambique due to recurring attacks on civilians and governmental forces by non-state armed groups since 2017; and OHCHR, March 2024. [Displaced people in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado plead for peace](#).

³⁴ Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP). August 2024. [Análise da situação de segurança.pdf](#); and UN International Organization for Migration. June 2024. [Displacement Tracking Matrix Mozambique](#).

³⁵ Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR). 5 March 2024. [Weakening of the state, fraying of the social tissue and lack of prospects for resolving the conflict.pdf](#).

³⁶ Cambrão et al. 2022. [Cabo Delgado: guerra fratricida \(des\)conhecida? Causas e implicações internas a partir de um olhar antropológico](#).

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. 31 January 2024. [Cabo Ligado Actor Profile FADM.pdf](#).

³⁹ Club of Mozambique. 5 October 2024. [Cabo Delgado Structural and systemic poverty behind four years of insurgency](#).

⁴⁰ Feijó J. 2020. “Characterization and social organization of Machababos from the discourse of kidnapped women”. Translated into English. Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR). [Characterization and social organization of Machababos.pdf](#).

⁴¹ Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR). 5 March 2024.

<https://omrmz.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/DR-268-ENG-1.pdf>.

⁴² Institute for Security Studies. 30 May 2024. [SAMIM withdrawal from Cabo Delgado - uncomfortable truths](#); Southern African Development Community. 5 April 2024. [Withdrawal of Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique - SAMIM](#); Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. 27 September 2024. [RDF operations abroad signal a shift in Rwanda's regional standing](#); and Club of Mozambique. 2 July 2024. [President highlights the importance of Tanzania in combating insurgency](#).

⁴³ Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP). August 2024. [Análise da situação de segurança.pdf](#).

⁴⁴ Zitamar News. 20 February 2023. [Who are the Naparama?](#).

the military, which “risks the spread of the insurgency”, as can be seen by their dispersal to other towns and districts.⁴⁵ According to Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP): “This situation is generating 'islands of security' in the areas under the influence of LNG projects, where stability can be considered to exist [...] while on the periphery insecurity persists”.⁴⁶

OMR warns that, “Military action and advance are important, because they capture territory and limit the initiative of insurgents, but if they are not accompanied by the creation of economic opportunities, youth employment, education, professional technical training and space for dialogue and democratic participation, we will have a situation of prolonged and intermittent armed conflict”.⁴⁷

Will the financiers of Mozambique LNG accept their responsibility?

In 2020, 31 financial institutions including [Financial Institution] took part in loan agreements, and committed to provide a total of USD 14.9 billion to Mozambique LNG.⁴⁸ We, civil society organizations from Mozambique and around the world, are aware that TotalEnergies has been approaching banks and export credit agencies in order to secure their renewed support in view of a lifting of the *force majeure*. We also know that **such renewed support cannot and should not happen without a reassessment of the project.**

The financial partners in this project are responsible alongside TotalEnergies for the project’s devastating consequences on Mozambique and the global community. The restart of the project cannot happen without your active support. **It is in your hands to ensure justice for the people affected by this project, and for the survivors and witnesses of the reported massacre near the Afungi gas site.** The *force majeure* provides [Financial Institution] with an opportunity to reconsider its involvement in this project.

Given the evidence summarised above and the high human rights and reputational risks associated with Mozambique LNG:

- we are urging all financiers to **endorse the call for an independent international investigation** into the alleged massacre of civilians reported to have occurred near the Afungi gas premises in July-September 2021 (see box page 04);
- we further **urge financiers to withhold any decisions around the continuation or release of any financial support to this project, before all facts and responsibilities are investigated, and the result of such an investigation made public;**
- we are **warning financiers and all parties linked to the project of the risks** of continuing their support for a project that is linked to severe human rights violations against civilians; and

⁴⁵ Institute for Security Studies. 26 September 2024. [Are Rwandan Troops Becoming Cabo Delgado's Main Security Provider.](#)

⁴⁶ Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP). August 2024. [Analise da situacao de seguranca.pdf.](#)

⁴⁷ Club of Mozambique. 5 October 2024. [Cabo Delgado Structural and systemic poverty behind four years of insurgency.](#)

⁴⁸ 28 financial institutions took part in the 14.9 billion dollars project financing in July 2020. ECAs include Export Import Bank of the United States (US EXIM), UK Export Finance (UKEF), Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero (SACE), Atradius Dutch State Business (ADSB). Commercial banks include Société Générale (the financial advisor of TotalEnergies for the project), Crédit Agricole, JPMorgan, Mizuho Bank, Standard Chartered Bank. See [full list here.](#)

- we are asking all financiers to publicly rule out support for any new gas projects in Mozambique, including Rovuma LNG and Coral North FLNG.

We kindly request an answer to this letter before January 17 2025. We will incorporate the bank's response in our future communications. We remain available for further discussions with you and your team and will pay close attention to your decision.

Yours sincerely,

Justiça Ambiental! / Friends of the Earth Mozambique
 Les Amis de la Terre France / Friends of the Earth France
 Reclaim Finance
 BankTrack
 Urgewald
 Friends of the Earth Japan
 ReCommon
 Milieudefensie / Friends of the Earth Netherlands
 Friends of the Earth Europe
 Friends of the Earth United States
 Solutions for Our Climate

126 civil society organisations from around the world have endorsed this letter:

350.org	International
350Hawaii	United States
AbibiNsroma Foundation	Ghana
Accountability Counsel	International
ActionAid International	Global (HQ in South Africa)
ActionAid Italy	Italy
ActionAid Netherlands	the Netherlands
Action Justice Climat Paris	France
Africa Institute for Energy Governance	Uganda
Afrikagrupperna	Sweden
Alofa Tuvalu	France, Tuvalu
Amazon Watch	International
Andy Gheorghiu Consulting	Germany
AnsvarligFremtid	Denmark
Associação Academia Cidadã	Portugal
Attac Austria	Austria
Attac France	France
Bank Climate Advocates	United States / International
BankTrack	the Netherlands
BLOOM	France
Botshabelo Unemployed Movement	South Africa

BreakFree Suisse	Switzerland
Care For Environment	Cameroun
CCFD-Terre Solidaire	FRANCE
Center for Environment / Friends of the Earth Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)	United States
Centre for Citizens Conserving Environment & Management (CECIC)	Uganda
Centre for Social Change	South Africa
Community Action Against Plastic Waste (CAPws)	Nigeria
Community Resource Centre (CRC)	Thailand
Corner House	United Kingdom
Counter Balance	EU (Belgium)
CRAAD-OI	Madagascar
Debt Observatory in Globalisation (ODG)	Catalonia/Spain
Don't Gas Africa	Kenya
Earth Action, Inc.	United States
Earthjustice	United States
EKOenergy ecolabel	International
Environmental center for Development Education and Networking (EDEN)	Albania
Environment Governance Institute Uganda	Uganda
Enviro Vito	South Africa
ETO Watch	Thailand
Extinction Rebellion France Carnage Total	France
Fair Finance International	International
For a Better Bayou	United States
Fossilvrij NL	the Netherlands
Friends of the Earth Australia	Australia
Friends of the Earth Canada	Canada
Friends of the Earth, England, Wales & Northern Ireland	United Kingdom
Friends of the Earth Europe	Europe
Friends of the Earth Ireland	Ireland
Friends of the Earth Japan	Japan
Friends of the Earth Spain	Spain
Friends of the Earth United States	United States
Génération Consciente pour l'Environnement et la Culture GCEC Cameroun	Cameroun
Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (EJAtlas.org)	Spain / Global
Global Justice Now	United Kingdom
GreenFaith Africa	Kenya
Green leaf Advocacy and Empowerment Center	Nigeria

Greenpeace France	France
groundWork/ Friends of the Earth South Africa	South Africa
Gulf South Fossil Finance Hub	United States
Hawkmoth	the Netherlands
Innovation pour le Développement et la Protection de l'Environnement	DR Congo
Instituto Natura	Peru
Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)	Japan
Jordens Vänner - Friends of the Earth Sweden	Sweden
Jubilee Australia	Australia
Justiça Ambiental (JA!) / Friends of the Earth Mozambique	Mozambique
Just Share	South Africa
Kallop Humanitarian and Environmental Center	Nigeria
Lamu women alliance	Kenya
Laudato Si' Movement Africa	Kenya
LDH (Ligue des droits de l'Homme)	France
Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Friends of the Earth Philippines	Philippines
Les Amis de la Terre - Belgique asbl	Belgium
Les Amis de la Terre France	France
Les Amis de la Terre - Togo	Togo
Linha Vermelha - Red Line	Portugal
LUCSA- Infohut	Namibia
Marikana youth development organization	South africa
Market Forces	Australia
Matlhodi organization	South Africa
Mekong Watch	Japan
Milieudedefensie	the Netherlands
MIMAMO	Mozambique
Money Rebellion	United Kingdom
Mothers Rise Up	United Kingdom
Mouvement écologique	Luxembourg
Natural Justice	South Africa
Natural Resource Women Platform (NRWP)	Liberia
New Environmental Justice Solutions	South Africa
NOAH - Friends of the Earth Denmark	Denmark
Nordic Center for Sustainable Finance	Denmark and Norway
Notre Affaire à Tous	France
Odeibea Foundation	Ghana
Oil Change International	United States

Peace Point Development Foundation (PPDF)	Nigeria
Positive Money	United Kingdom
PowerShift e.V.	Germany
Profundo	the Netherlands
Quest For Growth and Development Foundation	Nigeria
Rainforest Action Network	United States
RAPEN	Sénégal
Reclaim Finance	France
ReCommon	Italy
Recourse	International
Réseau Action Climat (RAC)	France
Réseau étudiant pour une société écologique et solidaire (RESES)	France
Re-set: platform for socio-ecological transformation	Czech republic
Rettet den Regenwald / Rainforest Rescue	Germany
Rural Communities Empowerment Trust	Zimbabwe
Scientifiques en Rébellion	France
SDI	Liberia
Shujaa-Initiative	Democratic republic of Congo
Society for Women and Youths Affairs (SWAYA)	Nigeria
Society of Native Nations	United States
Solutions for our Climate (SFOC)	South Korea
South African Faith Communities Environment Institute (SAFCEI)	South Africa
South Texas Environmental Justice Network	United States
Stand.earth	United States & Canada
Sustainable Development Institute (SDI)	Liberia
The Mekong Butterfly	Thailand
Urgewald	Germany
Waterberg Women Advocacy Organization	South Africa
WeSmellGas	Belgium
Zehar-Errefuxituekin	Euskal Herria, Spain

